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Abstract-The purpose of this paper is to present a new decomposition technique, called the 
weighted decomposition construction, for perfect secret sharing schemes with general access struc- 
tures. This construction is more general than previous constructions. Based on the weighted decom- 
position construction, we improve the information rates in four cases out of the 18 cases of secret 
sharing schemes left unsolved for connected graphs on six vertices. @ 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All 
rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A secret sharing scheme is a method which allows a secret K to be shared among a set of partic- 
ipants P in such a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret [1,2]. A 
special case of secret sharing schemes is the threshold scheme [3,4] in which all groups of partici- 
pants of at least some fixed size are qualified. Secret sharing schemes have many applications in 
different areas, such as access control, launching a missile, opening a bank vault, or even opening 
a deposit box. For a more detailed description of secret sharing schemes and a wide discussion 
of their applications, we refer the reader to the excellent survey papers [5,6]. A current and 
complete bibliography can also be found online [7]. For a secret sharing scheme, the informa- 
tion kept by each participant is called a share. The secret K is chosen by a special participant, 
the dealer, who is also responsible for computing and distributing the shares. The collection of 
subsets of participants that can reconstruct the secret in this way is called the access structure, 
denoted by l?. It is natural to require l? to be monotone, that is, if X E r and X C X’, then 
X’ E r. A minimal qualified subset Y E l? is a subset of participants such that Y’ $ l? for all 
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Y’ c Y. The basis of I’, denoted by Is, is the family of all minimal qualified subsets. Let 2p 
denote the collection of all subsets of P. For any I’0 C_ 2’, the closure of I’c is defined to be 
cl(I’c) = {X’ : 3X E I’o, X C X’ C P}. Therefore, an access structure I? is the same as the 
closure of its basis I’s, cl(l?s). A secret sharing scheme is perfect if unqualified subsets of par- 
ticipants obtain no information regarding the secret [8,9]. This means that the prior probability 
p(K = Ko) equals the conditional probability p(K = Ks 1 given any shares of an unqualified set). 
The information theoretic models for threshold schemes and secret sharing schemes were defined 
by Karnin et al. [lo] and Capocelli et al. [ll], respectively. We refer to [12] for a treatment of 
information theory. Following the approach of [ll], we can state the requirements for a secret 
sharing scheme by using the entropy function H as follows: 
(1) any qualified subset can reconstruct the secret 
Vx,rH(K I X) = 0; 
(2) any unqualified subset has no information on the secret 
There are some different approaches to measuring the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme, 
such ss the information rate, the average information rate, and the dealer’s randomness. The 
information rate of a secret sharing scheme is the ratio between the length of the secret and the 
maximum length of the shares [8]. The average information rate of a secret sharing scheme is the 
ratio between the length of the secret and the arithmetic mean of the length of all shares [13]. 
The dealer’s randomness is the number of random bits required by the dealer to set up a secret 
sharing scheme [14,15]. In this paper, we focus on studying the information rates of perfect secret 
sharing schemes. 
Given any access structure I, Ito et al. [2,16] showed that there exists a perfect secret sharing 
scheme to realize the structure. Benaloh and Leichter (171 proposed a different algorithm to realize 
secret sharing schemes for any given monotone access structures. However, in both constructions, 
the information rate exponentially decreases as a function of n, the number of participants. After 
that, many researchers focused on studying perfect secret sharing schemes for graph-baaed access 
structure with basis I’s, where I?,-, is the collection of the pairs of participants corresponding to 
edges (8,9,11,18,19]. Among these constructions, Stinson [20] proposed the idea of decomposition 
construction, which is more general than previous constructions [6,8,11,13,18,19,21]. In addition, 
he proved that for any graph G with n vertices having maximum degree d, there exists a perfect 
secret sharing scheme for the access structure based on G in which the information rate is at 
least 2/(d + 1). Recently, Blundo et al. [22] showed that Stinson’s lower bound is tight. 
Given any access structure, it is difficult to determine the optimal information rate. Therefore, 
some researchers [6,8,9,11,18,19,21,23,24] have begun to study the optimal information rates of 
perfect secret sharing schemes for a small number of participants. All connected access structures 
on less than four participants can easily be seen to have the optimal information rate 1. The 
optimal information rates of all connected access structures on four participants can be found 
in [6,11,24]. The information rates of perfect secret sharing schemes on five participants were 
studied by Jackson and Martin [23]. In 175 out of the 180 nonisomorphic connected access 
structures on five participants, they determined the exact optimal information rates. The optimal 
information rates of secret sharing schemes for all graphs on at most five vertices were determined 
in recent years [19,21]. In (91, vanDijk studied the information rates of secret sharing schemes 
for connected graphs on six vertices. In 94 out of the 112 connected graphs on six vertices, he 
determined the optimal information rates. 
In this paper, we propose a new decomposition theorem, called the weighted decomposition 
construction, which is more general than previous constructions. Based on the weighted decom- 
position construction, we improve the information rates in four cases out of 18 cases of secret 
sharing schemes left unsolved for connected graphs on six vertices. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic 
preliminaries for secret sharing schemes. In Section 3, we define and realize secret sharing schemes 
for weighted access structures. In Section 4, we propose the weighted decomposition construction 
for secret sharing schemes. In Section 5, we show the weighted decomposition construction can 
be used to improve the information rates in four cases out of 18 cases of secret sharing schemes 
left unsolved for connected graphs on six vertices. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Let K be the secret space and S be the maximum share space. The information rate for 
a secret sharing scheme is defined as p = log, ]K]/logz (S] (see [8]). The information rate for 
share Si is defined as pi = log, ]K]/logz ISi], w h ere Si is the share space for Si. Here, we use the 
notation PS(I’a, p, q) to denote a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure cl(I’c) and 
information rate p for a set of q keys. 
Suppose r is an access structure with basis Pa. A X-decomposition of PO consists of a collection 
{rl,, . . , I?,) such that the following requirements are satisfied. 
(1) rh c ro, for 1 5 h 5 t. 
(2) For each X E Pa, there exists at least X indices ii < .. . < ix such that X E I’+ for 
l<j<X. 
Let Ph be the set of participants in a scheme with access structure cl(I’h). Stinson [20] proposed 
the decomposition construction (DC) for secret sharing schemes. His decomposition construction 
is more general than other well-known constructions [6,8,11,13,18,19,21]. 
THEOREM 2.1. DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION, DC. (See [ZOj.) Let I? be an access structure 
on n participants with basis r. and suppose that {l?i, . . . , l?,} is a &decomposition of PO. Assume 
that for each access structure Cl(??h), there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme with information 
rate &h for each pi E Ph, and a set of q keys. Then, there exists a PS(I’e, p, q’), where 
Let DC1 and DC& be two different decomposition constructions of an access structure. We say 
DC1 dominates DC2 if pi 2 pf for all participants pi, where pi is the information rate for pi in 
DC1 and p: is the information rate for pi in DC2. 
Let us consider the case when the basis of an access structure is a graph and l?is are complete 
multipartite graphs. Since there exists a PS(G, p = 1, q) for every complete multipartite graph [8], 
we obtain the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2. (See [9,20].) Suppose access structure G is a graph with vertex set V and edge 
set E, for which a complete multipartite covering exists, say II = {Gi, . . . , Gt}. For each vertex 
w E V, define R, = I{i : w E &}I, w h ere Vi denotes the vertex set of Gi. For each edge e E E, 
define T, = I{i : e E Ei}I, where Ei denotes the edge set of Gi. Let R = max{& : v E V} and 
T = min{T, : e E E}. Then, there exists a PS(G, p, qT), where q is a prime power and p 2 T/R. 
3. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES FOR 
WEIGHTED ACCESS STRUCTURES 
In this section, we generalize secret sharing schemes for general access structures to secret 
sharing schemes for weighted access structures. 
A weighted access structure for a secret sharing scheme, denoted by rw, is a set {(X, W(X)) ( 
W(X) L 0, W(X) E Z, for all X E 2p}. The weight of rut is defined by W(lY,) = max{lV(X) : 
for all X E 2p}. 
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A secret sharing scheme for a weighted access structure Iu, is a method which allows W(I’,) 
secrets of the same size to be shared among a set of participants P in such a way that each subset 
of participants, X, can exactly recover W(X) secrets out of the W(I’,) secrets. Therefore, if 
W(X) = IV@‘,), then X uniquely determines all the secrets; and if W(X) = 0, then X cannot 
obtain any information on any secret. For a weighted access structure, it is natural that we require 
the following property: if X E X’ s P, then W(X) 5 W(X’). The information rate of a secret 
sharing scheme for a weighted access structure is the ratio between the total length of the secrets 
and the maximum length of the shares. The information rate for a share is the ratio between 
the total length of the secrets and the length of the share. We remark here that the length of 
shares may be smaller than the total length of secrets for a perfect secret sharing scheme with 
a weighted access structure; i.e., the information rates for shares (or the secret sharing scheme) 
may be larger than one. 
EXAMPLE 3.1. Let rw be the weighted access structure for a secret sharing scheme, where 
P = {Pl,P2#3) ad rw = {(pl,O),(Pz,O),(P3,0)r(PlP2,2)(PlP3r3)(P2P34),(~1~2~3,6)). 
We construct a secret sharing scheme as follows. Let the secret K = (Kl, K2, Ks, KJ, Kg, Ks) 
be taken randomly from GF(q)6, where q is a prime power. The dealer selects six random 
numbers, ~-1, . . . , 7-6, over GF(q). Let f(5) = ~1% + KI (mod 4). The value yi computed from 
f(z) is as follows: yi = f(i) (mod q) f or i = 1,2,3. Therefore, given yi and yj for i # j, Ki = f(0) 
can be determined uniquely. 
The shares are given by 
‘% = (YlrT2,~3,~4), 
s2 = (Y2,7-2 + K2,TQ,T5rT6), and 
s3 = (y3,7-3 + K3,7-4 + K4,7-5 + K5,T6 + KG). 
Thus, 
(~1, m) can r=over KI, K2, 
(~1, ~3) cm recover Kl , K3, &, 
{pa, ps} can recover KI , Ks, KS, Ks, and 
{~l,pz,w) cm recover K~,K~,K~,K~,K~,Ks. 
In addition, none of ~1, pz, or ps can recover any Ki for 1 5 i < 6. The information rates for 
these shares and the secret sharing scheme are pi = 312, p2 = 615, ps = 615, and p = 615, 
respectively. 
A weighted graph is a graph with weights associated with the edges. We use the notation 
W,(G) to denote the weight of an edge e in a graph G and W(G) to denote the maximum weight 
of all weights of edges in graph G. We define that a perfect secret sharing scheme, sharing W(G) 
secrets for a weighted graph G = (V, E) with weights W,(G) (W,(G) 2 1) for e E E, is a secret 
sharing scheme which satisfies the following requirements: 
(1) any pair of participants corresponding to an edge e of G can obtain W,(G) secrets out of 
the W(G) secrets, and 
(2) any subset of participants containing no edge of G has no information on the W(G) secrets. 
Note that the case for which X (at least three participants) contains at least two edges of G is 
not defined here. In this case, X should obtain at least W(X) secrets and at most W(G) secrets 
where W(X) = max{W,(G) : for e c X}. 
A secret sharing scheme for a weighted graph can be realized by the decomposition construction. 
As an example, we demonstrate the construction of the secret sharing scheme for a weighted 
graph G, shown in Figure 1, by using the decomposition construction technique. By examining 
all DCs, we find that there exist three DCs which are not dominated by other DCs. These three 
DCs are shown in Figures 2-4. It is clear that the information rates for shares in these DCs are 
as follows. 
CASE 1. pi = 2, p2 = 1, p3 = 1, p4 = 2, p5 = 1, ps = I. 
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Figure 1. Graph G. 
P6 P6 
Figure 2. The DC for graph G (Case 1). 
P6 
Figure 3. The DC for graph G (Case 2). 
PS 
PT;;I p2 e* :’ P3 p2 P3 P4 
Figure 4. The DC for graph G (Case 3). 
CASE 2. p1 = 2, p.2 = 1, p3 = 213, p4 = 2, p5 = 2, p6 = 2. 
CASE 3. p1 = 2, p2 = 213, p3 = 1, p4 = 2, p5 = 2, ps = 2. 
In the following, we show that there exist other constructions so that the constructed secret 
sharing schemes for weighted graphs have higher information rates for shares than those con- 
structed by applying the DC technique. 
We define a double-star graph as a weighted graph which satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) the graph can be decomposed into two stars exactly; 
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(2) the centers of the stars are two adjacent vertices, say pi and pj for i # j; 
(3) the weight of pipj is 2; 
(4) except for pipj, each edge of the graph has weight 1. 
It is clear that graph G in Figure 1 is a double-star graph. Given any double-star graph, we 
have the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3.1. Suppose G is a double-star graph with centers of the stars, pi and pj. Then, 
there exists a secret sharing scheme for the weighted graph G such that pi = pj = 1 and pk = 2 
forlc#iorj. 
PROOF. We construct the secret sharing scheme by the following method. Assume the secret 
K = (KI, Kz) is taken randomly from GF(q)2. The share of pi is given by Si = (rl + K1, Q) 
(mod q) and the share of pj is given by Sj = (TI,T~ + K2) (mod q). The share of pk is given by 
Sk = ~1 (mod q), if pipk E E(G) and pjprc 6 E(G), 
Sk = r2 (mod q), if pipk $! E(G) and m E E(G), and 
Sk = r1 + r2 (mod q), if piprc E E(G) and pjpk E E(G). 
It is clear that pi and pj can recover the secret (Kl, K2) because Si = (rl + K1, r2) and 
Sj = (rl,rz + Kz). If piprc E E(G) and pjpk $! E(G), then pi and pk can recover K1 because pk 
owns rl and pi owns r1 + Kl. If m # E(G) and pjpk E E(G), then pj and pk can recover K2 
because pk owns rp and pj owns rp + K2. If pipk E E(G) and pjpk E E(G), then pi and pk 
can recover K1 because pk owns r1 + r2 and pi owns r2 and r1 + K1. Similarly, pj and pk can 
recover K2 because pk owns r1 + rp and pj owns rl, r2 + K2. It is obvious that pi = pi = 1 and 
pk=2fork#iorj. I 
As an example of the construction in Theorem 3.1, we obtain a secret sharing scheme for the 
weighted graph G in Figure 1, and the information rates for shares are p1 = 2, p2 = 1, p3 = 1, 
p4 = 2, ps = 2, and ps = 2. This construction dominates the decomposition constructions shown 
in Figures 2-4. 
4. WEIGHTED DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION 
FOR PERFECT SECRET SHARING SCHEMES 
In this section, we propose the weighted decomposition construction for perfect secret sharing 
schemes with general access structures and graph-based access structures. This construction is 
based on the secret sharing schemes for weighted access structures. 
We generalize the concept of decomposition construction as follows. Suppose I’ is an access 
structure. A X-weighted-decomposition of l? consists of a collection {I’l, . . . , I’,} such that the 
following requirements are satisfied. 
(1) Each rh is a weighted access structure, for 1 5 h < t. 
(2) For each X E r, there exists some indices, say il < . . . < ik, such that Cij W(X; rij) 2 X, 
where W(X;I’ij) is the weight of X in l?ij, for 1 5 j 5 k. 
(3) For each X $ I?, C”,=, W(X; rh) = 0. 
THEOREM 4.1. WEIGHTED DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION, WDC. Let l? be an access struc- 
ture on n participants, and {l?l, . . . ,I’,} be a X-weighted-decomposition of r. Assume that for 
each weighted accessstructure I’h with weight W(I’h), 1 5 h 5 t, there exists a perfect secret 
sharing scheme with key set GF(q)W(rh) and information rate pih for each pi E Ph. Then, there 
exists a perfect secret sharing scheme for l? with information rate 
p = min 
( 
(h PZ_ ,(i(rh)iah) 
:l<iln . 
:t , 1 
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PROOF. We construct a secret sharing scheme as follows. Let the secret K = (Kl, . . . , Kx) be 
taken randomly from Cl’(q)‘, where q is a prime power. Let f(z) = K~x~\-l+ . . + + Kzx + Kl 
(mod q). yi is computed from f(z) as follows: yi = f(i) (mod q), for i = 1,. . . , ck=, W(l?h). 
Obviously, given X yis, f(z) can be determined uniquely. Hence, the secret K can be recovered. 
However, one without knowledge of any yi obtains no information about the secret. 
These yis are protected by the secret sharing schemes with weighted access structures l?h for 
1 2 h 5 t. We assume that yis, for i = 1,. . . , W(l?i), are protected by the secret sharing scheme 
with weighted access structure Ii. Similarly, yis, for i = C;z: lV(rj) + 1,. . . , Ct=, W(l?,), are 
protected by the secret sharing scheme with weighted access structure l?h, 2 5 h 5 t. 
The share for participant pi is given by Si = (Si,i, . . . , S&h,. . , SQ), where S&h is the share 
for participant pi in the secret sharing scheme with weighted access structure l?h, 1 5 h 5 t. 
It is clear that for each X E l?, there exist indices ii < . . . < ik, such that & W(X; I’ij) 2 X. 
Therefore, X can obtain at least X yis, and hence, the secret K. 
On the other hand, for each X @ I’, EL=, W(X; rh) = 0. Therefore, X obtains no information 
on any yi and hence, the secret K. The key set of the perfect secret sharing scheme with rh is 
GF(q)w(r”). The share set for pi in the perfect secret sharing scheme with I,& is GF(q)W(r~~)/pi~~. 
Therefore, the key set of the constructed secret sharing scheme with I’ is GF(q)cIj w(rjh) = 
GF(q)X. The share set for pi in the perfect secret sharing scheme with I is GF(q)~~~ w(r~~)lPi~~. 
Hence, the information rate of the constructed secret sharing scheme with I’ is 
Suppose G = (V, E) is a weighted graph. A X-weighted-decomposition of G consists of a 
collection {Gi, . . . , Gt} such that the following requirements are satisfied. 
(1) Gh 2 G is a weighted graph, for 1 < h 5 t. 
(2) For each e E E, there exist some indices, say ii < ... < ik, such that & We(Gij) 2 X. 
Let Ph be the set of participants in a scheme with access structure based on Gh. We obtain the 
following theorem. 
THEOREM 4.2. WDC FOR GRAPH. Let G be a graph of access structure on n participants, and 
suppose that {Gl, . . . , Gt} is a X-weighted-decomposition of G. Assume that for each weighted 
graph Gh, 1 5 h 5 t, there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme with information rate Pih for 
each pi E Ph. Then, there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme for G with information rate 
:l<i<n - 
5. IMPROVEMENTS OF GRAPHS Gg, G22, G40, AND G61 IN [9] 
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the weighted decomposition construction, we show 
that the weighted decomposition construction can be used to improve the information rate of 
secret sharing schemes for graphs Ga, Gss, Gdc, and Gsi in [9]. 
As an application of WDC for graph, we consider that each Gh is either a complete multipartite 
graph or a double-star graph, for 1 5 h 5 t. Thus, we can improve the information rate in 
four cases out of the 18 cases of secret sharing schemes left unsolved for. connected graphs on six 
vertices [9]. For the graph Gs in [9], we can improve the lower bound on the information rate from 
l/2 to 4/7. For the graph Gss in [9], we can improve the lower bound on the information rate from 
5/9 to 4/7. For the graph Gqc in [9], we can improve the lower bound on the information rate from 
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519 to 417. For the graph Gsi in [9], we can improve the lower bound on the information rate from 
l/2 to 9/16. For simplicity, in the following example, we only give the concrete construction of the 
secret sharing scheme for the graph Gs. Other concrete constructions of the secret sharing schemes 
for graphs Gs2, Gdc, and Gsi can be easily done following the same approach. In the Appendix, 
we list the weighted decomposition constructions of these improvements for graphs Gss, Gdc, 
and Gel. 
EXAMPLE 4.1. A WEIGHTED DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION FOR Gc. The weighted decom- 
position construction for the graph Ga is as shown in Figure 5. 
Pl P3 
= 
Graph G 
1 
/ 
0 
+2x 
I 
l 1 
a 
+2x 
1 
1 
.’ 2 
P 
8 
1 
l \ 
8 b 
Figure 5. Graph Gg. 
So, the secret sharing scheme for Ga is setup as follows. Let the secret K = (Kl, K2, KS, K4) 
be taken randomly from GF(q)4, where q is a prime power. Let f(x) = K1 + K2a: + Kgr2 + K4x3 
(mod q). The value yis computed from f(z) are as follows: yi = f(i) (mod qj, for i = 1,. . . ,12. 
It is clear that given four yjs, f(z) can be determined uniquely, and hence, the secret K can 
be recovered. On the contrary, one who does not have any knowledge of these yis obtains no 
information on the secret K. The shares for pis are assigned as follows: 
Sl = b-1,r317-7,7% + YS), 
~2=(~1+~2,~3,~4+y4,~5+y5,~6,~9,~lO+ylO)r 
s3 = @-4,f5,T9 + Y9r QO), 
s4 = (TZ,r6,%,Tl2 +ylZ), 
s5= ~~l,~Z+y2,~3+~4,~5,~6+y6,~11+Yllr~12~r 
s6 = (~1+y1,~2,~3+y3,~4,~5+~6,~7+y7r7‘8)~ 
Thus, 
{PlrPG) Cm WWfX Yl,Y3rY7,?& 
{~J2,p3) can recover Y~,Ys,~~,YIo~ 
{p%pS) can recover y2~y4~y5,yS~ 
{p2, p6 1 Can recover yl , y3, y4, y5, 
{p4,~5) can recover y2,y6,~11,~12, and 
{pS%p6) Can recover YlTy2,y3ry6. 
Thus, all above pairs can obtain four yis, and hence, they can recover the secret K. On the 
contrary, no other pair can obtain any information on yis. It is clear that the information rates 
for these shares are pi = 1, ps = 7/4, ps = 1, p4 = 1, pa = 7/4, and @3 = 7/4. Hence, the 
information for the constructed secret sharing scheme is p = 714. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Since van Dijk showed the optimal information rates of 94 graphs out of 112 connected graphs 
on six vertices in 1995, no further result has been reported over these years. In this paper, 
we propose the concept of secret sharing schemes for weighted access structures in which each 
subset of participants can recover a quantity of secrets according to the weight of the subset. 
By decomposing an access structure into weighted access structures, we propose the weighted 
decomposition construction technique to generalize Stinson’s decomposition construction. Such 
a generalization improves the information rates in four cases out of the 18 cases of secret sharing 
schemes left unsolved for connected graphs on six vertices. We note that, in order to make 
these improvements, we include a special weighted access structure-the double-star graph, in 
which there exists a secret sharing scheme that is not dominated by Stinson’s decomposition 
construction. We believe that if other special weighted access structures can be found, we can 
further improve not only these four cases but also the other 14 cases of secret sharing schemes 
left unsolved for connected graphs on six vertices. 
APPENDIX 
WEIGHTED DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION 
Graph GD 
0 /r / 8 . a 1 l ’ 1 . . . . . M 
+ +2x +2x I 
= + 1 
Graph GM 
. 1 
. 
/ 
I 
. 
+2X 
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Graph G, 
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